We use the axiomatization of the position value for network situations in van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012) to define a position value for partition function form network situations by generalizing the axioms to the partition function form value function setting as studied in Navarro (2007) and then showing that there exists a unique allocation rule satisfying these axioms. We call this allocation rule the position value for partition function form network situations.
Introduction
The interface of coalitional game theory and network theory has been studied extensively in recent years. Stability and allocation in networks are now better understood due to analyses that find their origins in economic settings that include collaborative alliances, job search, and friends and relatives. This paper contributes to the literature through a careful study of an allocation rule for network situations that allow for externalities.
We consider the network setting with externalities of Navarro (2007) and focus our attention on carefully defining a link-based allocation rule. We do this by taking the axioms used in the axiomatization of the position value for network situations in van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012) and considering extensions of these to the partition function form network situations of Navarro (2007) . Then, we show that there exists a unique allocation rule satisfying reasonable extensions of the axioms. We call this allocation rule the position value for partition function form network situations.
This paper brings three lines of research together by connecting ideas regarding games in partition function form, networks, and the position value. We will describe the three in turn.
Games in partition function form were introduced in Thrall and Lucas (1963) in order to be able to capture possible externalities between coalitions of players -something that is not possible to do in coalitional games. A game in partition function form allows for the values of coalitions of players to vary depending on how players outside the coalition are themselves organized in other coalitions. This is done by specifying for each coalition structure (i.e., a partition of the players into coalitions) a value for each of the coalitions formed by the players. There are many interesting situations in which there are externalities between coalitions and many papers exist that use partition function form games to study them. Such papers include (without trying to be exhaustive) dAspremont et al. (1983) on cartels, Tulkens and Chander (1997) on environmental externalities, and Funaki and Yamato (1999) on the common pool resource problem.
Finding sensible allocation rules for games in partition function form turns out to be a confusing task. The problem is that the allocation of a player or even a coalition cannot be determined in isolation. Most allocation rules rely on comparisons between a player being a member of various coalitions or not being a member of them, but when there are externalities we have to take into account how the players in other coalitions will react when the composition of one coalition changes. Several authors have made different assumptions about how the players in other coalitions will react. These include, among others, a status quo approach in which remaining players do not react (as in Cornet (1998) ), a pessimistic approach in which players react in such a way as to minimize the values of the deviating players (as in Lucas (1965) ), an optimistic approach in which deviating players anticipate the others to react so as to maximize the deviating players' values (as in Shapley and Shubik (1966) ), and an approach in which remaining coalitions are assumed to break apart into isolated players (as in Tulkens and Chander (1997) ).
Because of the multitude of possible assumptions regarding the behavior of non-deviating players, there are many ways to extend well-known solution concepts such as the core and the Shapley value to partition function form games. Dutta, Ehlers, and Kar (2010) have used potentials and consistency to define extensions of the Shapley value, while Macho-Stadler, Pérez-Castrillo, and Wettstein (2007) used what they called average games and the axioms efficiency, linearity, dummy player and "a strong symmetry axiom" to define extensions of the Shapley value. There are also many different extensions of the core to games in partition function form, see, for example, Koczy (2007) .
Networks in coalitional games allow one to model the effects of the formation of cooperative relationships between pairs of players when one player can be engaged in multiple relationships. Coalitional games augmented with networks have been studied extensively since their inception in Myerson (1977) . The theoretical research on this topic ranges from studies of the conditions on networks necessary for the preservation of certain properties such as convexity of the coalitional games and nonemptiness of the core when a network is limiting the possibilities of coalitions (cf. van den Nouweland and Borm (1991) and Slikker (2000) ), to the definition and study of allocation rules such as the Myerson value (cf. Myerson (1977) ) and the position value (cf. Borm, Owen, and Tijs (1992)), and noncooperative foundations of these and other allocation rules in Slikker (2007) . An overview of this literature until 2001 is provided in Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001) . Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) expanded the study of networks to situations where the values are given on networks directly, thereby allowing for the possibility that the value of a coalition of players who are connected by a network may vary depending on the composition of the network that connects them. Following the publication of Jackson and Wolinksy (1996), we saw a rapid expansion of the game-theoretic literature on networks and the theoretical branch of this literature includes papers on extensions of the Myerson value to network situations (cf. Jackson and Wolinksy (1996) ) and the study of the stability of networks (such as, for example, Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005)).
The position value is a link-based allocation rule for coalitional games augmented with networks that is based on the Shapley value. This sets it apart from the Myerson value, which is arguably one of the most popular solution concepts for (coalitional games augmented with) networks, and which is a player-based extension of the Shapley value (cf. Shapley 1953)) that takes into account the network-induced limitations on the coalitions of players that can potentially be formed. The position value is also based on the Shapley value, but it is link-centered and derives players' allocations from the values of the links that they maintain. Borm, Owen, and Tijs (1992) studied the position value and attempted to find a characterization of the position value that parallels the original characterization of the Shapley value in Shapley (1953) , but were successful in doing so only if they restricted themselves to considering cycle-free networks. Slikker (2005a and 2005b) provided axiomatic characterizations of the position value for arbitrary graphs that use balanced link contributions and potential functions, respectively. However, the problem of finding a Shapley-like axiomatic characterization of the position value without restrictions on the underlying networks was not solved until van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012) considered network situations as in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) rather than coalitional games augmented with networks as in Borm, Owen, and Tijs (1992) . This worked because network situations are a richer, more flexible setting that allows for the specific way in which a coalition of players is connected to be taken into account.
The current paper considers partition function form games arising from network situations. In such partition function form network situations the values of connected coalitions of players can vary as the connections between players outside the coalition change. In this setting, we identify an allocation rule by first carefully extending the axioms in van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012) from the setting of network situation to that of partition function form network situations, and then identifying a unique allocation rule that satisfies these axioms. We call the newly defined and axiomatized allocation rule the partition function form position value.
The papers closest to the current one are Navarro (2007) , which considers the same setting as we do -namely that of games in partition function form arising from networks -and studies an extension of the Myerson value, and van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012), which provides the axiomatization of the position value for network situations that we use in this paper to identify an allocation rule for partition function form network situations.
The setup of this paper is as follows. In the next section we explain the terminology and notations that we use for networks, partition function form value functions, and partition function form network situations and we also identify a basis of the space of partition function form value functions. In Section 3 we define allocation rules for partition function form network situations and we extend the axioms of van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012) to the setting of partition function form network situations. In Section 4 we then use these axioms and identify a unique allocation rule -the partition function form position value -that satisfies them. In Section 5 we address alternative potential extensions of the axioms in van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012) to the setting of partition function form network situations and investigate the feasibility of using these other extensions to define an allocation rule. We conclude in Section 6 with an explanation of how the results in the paper demonstrate that the partition function form position value that we define in Section 4 is, from an axiomatic perspective, the only candidate for an extension of the position value for network situations to the setting of partition function form network situations.
Preliminaries
In this section we explain the terminology and notations that we use for networks, partition function form value functions, and partition function form network situations. We also identify a basis of the space of partition function form value functions.
Networks
Throughout this paper, we consider a fixed set of players N = {1, . . . , n}.
A link is a subset {i, j} of two different players i, j ∈ N, i = j. As is customary in the literature, we often denote a link l = {i, j} by ij and we refer to l as "the link between players i and j". For any coalition of players S ⊆ N , we denote the set of all possible links between players in S by g S = {ij | i, j ∈ S, i = j}.
A network consists of a set of nodes and a set of links between these nodes. In this paper we will only consider networks on the set of nodes N and therefore we can identify a network with its links. Thus, a network is a set of links g ⊆ g N . We denote the set of all possible networks by G = {g | g ⊆ g N } and the set of non-empty networks, i.e., networks that include at least one link, by
A coalition of players S ⊆ N is said to be connected in a network g ∈ G if for any two players i, j ∈ S, there is a sequence of links in g that form a path from i to j, i.e., there exist an m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i m ∈ N such that i 1 = i, i k i k+1 ∈ g for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m − 1}, and i m = j. A network g ∈ G induces a partition C(g) of the player set N into connected coalitions that are set-inclusion maximal with respect to this property, namely C(g) = {S ⊆ N | S is connected in g and for any T ⊆ N with S ⊆ T it holds that either T = S or T is not connected in g}. A network g ∈ G is said to be connected if the set of all players N is connected in g. Thus, a network g ∈ G is connected if and only if C(g) = {N }.
For any network g ∈ G and any coalition S ⊆ N , we denote the set of all links in g that are between members of S by g(S) = g ∩ g S . The components of a network g are the subnetworks (S, g(S)) on the connected coalitions S ∈ C(g). Every S ∈ C(g) also gives rise to an embedded coalition (S, g) of the network g. The set of embedded coalitions of a network g ∈ G is denoted by EC(g) = {(S, g) | S ∈ C(g)} and the set of all embedded coalitions of any network is denoted by EC = {(S, g) | g ∈ G, S ∈ C(g)}. EC ne = {(S, g) | g ∈ G ne , S ∈ C(g)} denotes the set of all embedded coalitions of any non-empty network.
Partition Function Form Value Functions

A partition function form value function (pffvf ) is a function v : EC → IR that assigns a value to each embedded coalition (S, g). The set of all pff value functions is denoted by V. We assume that the pffvf is normalized so that v({i}, ∅) = 0 for all i ∈ N . 1 This has the interpretation that we only consider the possible gains (or losses) generated by connections (links) between the players.
A Basis of the Space of Partition Function Form Value Functions
For every embedded coalition (S, g) ∈ EC, we define a unanimity pff value function u S,g : EC → IR by
We show in Theorem 1 that every partition function form value function v can be written as a linear combination of unanimity pff value functions u S,g in a unique way. 2 We first introduce some notation and prove an intermediate result. 1 In the empty network all players are isolated, so that ({i}, ∅) is an embedded coalition
This result is reminiscent of the identification of a basis of the space of partition function form games in Grabisch (2010) . However, since we consider embedded coalitions in networks, our setting is different from that studied by Grabisch (2010) and thus we provide a proof of our result.
Define |S, g| = |S| + |g|, for every (S, g) ∈ EC. 3 Also, for all (S, g), (T, h) ∈ EC, we introduce the notations (S, g) ¢ (T, h) if S ⊆ T and g ⊆ h, and (S, g) ¡ (T, h) if (S, g) ¢ (T, h) but not (S, g) = (T, h). 4 Lemma 1 Let (S, g) and (T, h) ∈ EC such that (S, g) ¡ (T, h). Then g ⊂ h and |S, g| < |T, h|.
Proof. If g = h, then C(g) = C(h) and thus it follows from S ∈ C(g), T ∈ C(h), and S ⊆ T , that S = T . This would contradict (S, g) ¡ (T, h). Therefore, we can conclude that g ⊂ h. This, together with S ⊆ T , leads to |S, g| = |S| + |g| < |S| + |g| + 1 ≤ |S| + |h| ≤ |T | + |h| = |T, h|. P
We use Lemma 1 to show that the set of unanimity pff value functions {u S,g | (S, g) ∈ EC}, is a basis of the space of pff value functions.
Theorem 1 Every partition function form value function v can be written as a linear combination of unanimity pff value functions u S,g , (S, g) ∈ EC, in a unique way.
Proof. For any pff value function v and embedded coalition (T, h), we define the restriction of v to (T, h) as the function
Let µ S,g ∈ IR, (S, g) ∈ EC, and define a pffvf w by
Let v be a pff value function. We will show that we can find values for the coefficients µ S,g , (S, g) ∈ EC, such that w = v (thereby proving that v can be written as the linear combination of unanimity pff value functions) and we will also show that these coefficients are unique. The proof is a constructive one and we will construct the values of the coefficients starting with the smallest embedded coalitions and progressing to larger ones. We use λ S,g (v) to denote the unique coefficients that we are constructing for the pff value function v. Our proof proceeds by induction to |T, h|, which we can do because of Lemma 1 which implies that for all (S, g) such that (S, g) ¢ (T, h) either (S, g) = (T, h) or |S, g| < |T, h|. Since v = w if and only if v |(T,h) = w |(T,h) for all (T, h) ∈ EC, we can consider the restrictions of v and w to (T, h) and derive the coefficients λ S,g (v), (S, g) ¢ (T, h), and then use these in the induction step when progressing to a (T ,h) ∈ EC with |T ,h| > |T, h|.
We define coefficients λ S,g (v) ∈ IR, (S, g) ∈ EC, recursively by
Using induction to |T, h|, we will demonstrate for all (T, h) ∈ EC that
Initial
Step. Let (T, h) ∈ EC such that |T, h| = 1. It follows from Lemma 1 and the fact that |S,
The following string of equalities holds:
Induction
Step. Let (T, h) ∈ EC with |T, h| > 1 and suppose that we have already demonstrated that for all (T ,h) ∈ EC with |T ,h| < |T, h|
Then, it is a necessary and sufficient condition for
Thus, we find that for w(T, h) = v(T, h) to hold, we need
P
In the remainder of the paper we will use the notation in the proof of Theorem 1 and write a partition function form value function v ∈ V as a linear combination of unanimity pff value functions u S,g as follows:
where the coefficients λ S,g (v), (S, g) ∈ EC, are as defined in (1) . We refer to these coefficients as the unanimity coefficients of the pff value function v.
It follows from the proof of Theorem 1 that certain unanimity coefficients always equal 0.
Corollary 1 For every pff value function v ∈ V and for each player i it holds that λ {i},∅ (v) = 0.
Proof. Let i ∈ N . Then, obviously, ({i}, ∅) ∈ EC and |{i}, ∅| = 1. By our normalization assumption on pff value functions, we know that v({i}, ∅) = 0. It thus follows from (1) that λ {i},∅ (v) = v({i}, ∅) = 0. P Note that we have not assumed that the value of all embedded coalitions that consist of a single player equals 0. Thus, if g ∈ G ne and {i} ∈ C(g), then it is possible that λ {i},g = 0.
Partition Function Form Network Situations
A partition function form network situation (pff network situation) is a pair (g, v) consisting of a network g ∈ G and a partition function form value function v ∈ V. As a technical matter, we only need v to be defined on {(T, h) ∈ EC | h ⊆ g}, but it is easier in our notations to let v ∈ V and then ignore the values of v for embedded coalitions of networks that are not subnetworks of g.
Allocation Rules and Axioms for pff Network Situations
Allocation Rules
An allocation rule for pff network situations is a function Y :
to each player i in each network g ∈ G when the values of coalitions in networks are given by the pff value function v ∈ V.
Axioms
Our goal is to find an appropriate extension of the position value to the setting of pff network situations. We are going to use as a starting point the axiomatization of the position value for network situations in van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012) . In that paper we used 4 properties: efficiency, additivity, the superfluous link property, and anonymity. The philosophy is that if we define appropriate extensions of these axioms to the setting of pff network situations and we can prove that there exists a unique allocation rule for pff network situations that satisfies all these axioms, then this allocation rule is a good candidate for the definition of a position value for pff network situations.
Efficiency
In van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012) there are two efficiency properties, which are called component efficiency and efficiency, that can both be used in the axiomatization of the position value for network situations. One of these, component efficiency, is (in our eyes) not appealing in the setting of partition function form network situations, because in this setting we explicitly allow for the possibility that the value of a coalition of players varies if they are embedded in different networks (i.e., v(S, g) = v(S, h) if (S, g), (S, h) ∈ EC and g = h). Thus, we start by concentrating on extending the property called efficiency to the setting of partition function form network situations. We will consider the extension of component efficiency in Section 5.
for all pff value functions v ∈ V and all networks g ∈ G.
Additivity
The property additivity deals with the aggregation of value functions and its extension to a setting of partition function form network situations is straightforward.
Additivity An allocation rule Y is additive if
for all pff value functions v 1 , v 2 ∈ V and all networks g ∈ G.
Superfluous Link Property
The superfluous link property states that the presence or absence of a link that has no influence on the value, also has no influence on the players' allocations in a network. In the setting of partition function form network situations, there are two ways in which we can formalize the requirement that the presence or absence of a link has no influence on the value, depending on whether we want the deletion of a link to have no influence on the value obtained by all players in a network, or whether we want to satisfy the stronger condition that the deletion of a link has no influence on the value obtained by any connected coalition of players in a network. For now, we choose to follow a similar logic to that underlying the extension of the efficiency axiom and use the formalization in which the deletion of a link has no influence on the value obtained by all players in a network. We will consider the other option in Section 5. For any network g ∈ G and pff value function v ∈ V, a link l ∈ g is superfluous for g and v if
The extension of the superfluous link property to pff network situations is uncontroversial once superfluous links have been defined.
Superfluous Link Property An allocation rule Y satisfies the superfluous link property
for all pff value functions v ∈ V, all networks g ∈ G, and links l that are superfluous for g and v.
Link Anonymity
Link anonymity poses that players' payoffs should be proportional to the number of links in which they are involved in situations where the values of networks depend only on the number of links that compose them. The extension of link anonymity to the setting of partition function form network situations is straightforward. For any network g ∈ G, a pff value function v ∈ V is link anonymous on g if
for all subnetworks h, h ⊆ g that have the same number of links (i.e., |h| = |h |).
Link Anonymity An allocation rule Y is link anonymous if for every network g ∈ G and pff value function v ∈ V that is link anonymous on g, there exists an α ∈ IR such that
The Partition Function Form Position Value
Now that we have defined extensions of the axioms to the setting of pff network situations, we turn our attention to determining if these axioms characterize an allocation rule. Our approach consists of two steps. First, we show that there is at most one allocation rule satisfying the axioms, and then we define an allocation rule and show that this rule satisfies the axioms.
Uniqueness
The following theorem tells us that if there exists an allocation rule that satisfies efficiency, additivity, the superfluous link property, and link anonymity, then it is unique.
Theorem 2 There is at most one allocation rule for pff network situations that satisfies efficiency, additivity, the superfluous link property, and link anonymity.
Proof. Suppose Y : G × V → IR N is an allocation rule that satisfies efficiency, additivity, the superfluous link property, and link anonymity. Let g ∈ G and v ∈ V. We know that v
). Therefore, it suffices to demonstrate that there is at most one way to define
Let (T, h) ∈ EC and w := λ T,h (v)u T,h . We distinguish two cases. Case 1 Suppose h\g = ∅. Then for all h ⊆ g it holds that h ⊆ h and thus w(T , h ) = 0 for all T ∈ C(h ). Therefore,
for all networks h ⊆ g and w is link anonymous on g. By link anonymity of Y we can find an α ∈ IR such that Y i (g, w) = α |g i | for all i ∈ N . In the empty network |g i | = 0 for all i, which gives us
From this it follows that α = 0 must hold and thus
If h ⊆ g , then also h ⊆ g \{l}, and because T ∈ C(h), there is exactly one S ∈ C(g ) such that T ⊆ S and there is exactly one S ∈ C(g \{l}) such that T ⊆ S . Thus,
Thus, every link l ∈ g\h is superfluous for g and w, for every g ⊆ g with l ∈ g . Repeated application of the superfluous link property (deleting the links is g\h one by one) of Y allows us to conclude that
The pff value function w is link anonymous on h. Hence, by link anonymity of Y , we can find an α ∈ IR such that for each i ∈ N it holds that
Using efficiency of Y , we derive
Taking (3) and (4) together, we derive
If h = ∅, then |h i | = 0 for all i ∈ N and it follows from (3) that Y i (h, w) = 0 for each i ∈ N must hold. If h = ∅, then it follows from (5) that α = λ T,h (v) 2 |h| must hold. This, together with (2) and (3), demonstrates that Y (g, w) can be defined in at most one way. P
Existence
We prove existence of an allocation rule for pff network situations that satisfies efficiency, additivity, the superfluous link property, and link anonymity, by defining an allocation rule and showing that this rule satisfies the axioms. We will refer to the allocation rule that we define below as the partition function form position value because it will be shown to satisfy the axioms defined in Section 3.2 as extensions of the axioms used in van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012) to axiomatize the position value in the setting of network situations.
The Partition Function Form Position Value
The partition function form position value (pff position value for short) is the allocation rule π : G × V → IR N according to which each player i ∈ N in a network g ∈ G under pff value function v ∈ V receives
where h i = {l ∈ h | l = ij for some j ∈ N }, 5 the set of links in the network h in which player i is involved.
Note that in the definition of π we have to exclude the network h = ∅ because for that network |h| = 0 and we would be trying to divide by 0. However, the exclusion of the empty network is inconsequential, because EC(∅) = {({i}, ∅) | i ∈ N } and λ {i},∅ = 0 for all i ∈ N by Corollary 1. Also, if g = ∅, then we get the sum over an empty set of non-empty subnetworks h, which is equal to 0.
We proceed by proving that the above-defined allocation rule satisfies efficiency, additivity, the superfluous link property, and link anonymity.
Lemma 2 The partition function form position value is efficient.
Proof. Let v ∈ V and g ∈ G. Then
where the first equality follows from the definition of π, the second one from rearranging terms, the third one from counting, and the fourth one from Corollary 1. The sixth equality is more involved. It follows from the fact that for each h ∈ G with h ⊆ g, the partition C(h) is a refinement of the partition C(g), so that for each T ∈ C(h) there is exactly one S ∈ C(g) with (T, h) ¢ (S, g). The seventh equality holds because u T,h (S, g) = 0 if h\g = ∅. The last equality follows from the decomposition of v into unanimity games. P
Lemma 3
The partition function form position value is additive.
Proof. First we show that the unanimity coefficients are additive. Let
Then, for all (T, h) ∈ EC it holds that
Using that the unanimity coefficients are unique, we can thus conclude that
where the second equality follows from the additivity of the unanimity coefficients. P
Lemma 4
The partition function form position value satisfies the superfluous link property.
Proof. Let v ∈ V, g ∈ G, and let l ∈ g be superfluous for g and v.
We start by showing that
for all g ⊆ g with l ∈ g . We do this by induction to the number of links in a network.
Initial
Step. Let g ∈ G with g ⊆ g and l ∈ g and |g | = 1. Let i, j ∈ N such that l = ij. Then C(g ) consists of the pair {i, j} and the |N | − 2 singletons {k}, k ∈ N \{i, j}. For S = {k} ∈ C(g ), it holds that {(S,g) ∈ EC | (S,g) ¢ (S, g )} = {({k}, ∅), ({k}, g )}. For S = {i, j} ∈ C(g ), it holds that {(S,g) ∈ EC | (S,g) ¢ (S, g )} = {({i}, ∅), ({j}, ∅), ({i, j}, g )}.
where the fourth equality uses that λ ({k},∅) (v) = 0 for all k ∈ N (cf. Corollary 1). Since g \{l} = ∅, it also follows that
Because l is superfluous for g and v, we know that
Combining the three equalities above, we obtain
v(T, g \{l}) = 0.
Induction
Step. Let k > 1 and suppose that we have already demonstrated that (S,g )∈EC(g ) λ S,g (v) = 0 holds for all g ∈ G with g ⊆ g, l ∈ g and |g | < k. Let g ∈ G with g ⊆ g, l ∈ g and |g | = k.
where the third equality uses that {(S,g) ∈ EC | (S,g) ¢ (S, g )} = {(S,g) ∈ EC | (S,g) ¡ (S, g )} ∪ {(S, g )}, the fifth equality uses thatg ⊂ g if (S,g) ¡ (S, g ) (cf. Lemma 1), and the sixth equality uses that for everyg ⊂ g and S ∈ C(g) there is exactly one S ∈ C(g ) such thatS ⊆ S. The last equality follows from the induction hypothesis, because for eachg ⊂ g with l ∈g it holds that |g| < |g |, so that we know that (S,g)∈EC(g) λS ,g (v) = 0. Rearranging (7), we obtain
. (8) We also derive
Using (8), (9), and (10), respectively, we obtain
This concludes our proof of (6).
We continue proving that the partition form position value satisfies the superfluous link property.
where the fifth equality follows from (6) . P
Lemma 5
The partition function form position value satisfies link anonymity.
Proof. Let g ∈ G and v ∈ V such that v is link anonymous on g. We first show that
for all h, h ⊆ g with |h| = |h |. We do this by using induction to the number of links in a network. Note that we do not have to address networks with 0 links, because there is only one such network, so that the statement is true by virtue of the fact that two networks h and h with |h| = |h | = 0 necessarily satisfy h = h .
Initial
Step. Let h, h ∈ G with h, h ⊆ g and |h| = |h | = 1. Since |h| = 1, C(h) consists of one pair and |N |−2 singletons. Let T ∈ C(h).
If |T | = 1, then T = {i} for some i ∈ N and {(S,g) ∈ EC | (S,g) ¢ (T, h)} = {({i}, ∅), ({i}, h)}. If |T | = 2, then T = {i, j} for some i, j ∈ N and {(S,g) ∈ EC | (S,g) ¢ (T, h)} = {({i}, ∅), ({j}, ∅), ({i, j}, h)}.
where the fourth equality uses that λ ({i},∅) (v) = 0 for all i ∈ N (cf. Corollary 1), and the last equality that C(h) consists of one pair and |N |−2 singletons. Analogously, we derive that
Because v is link anonymous on g, we know that
Induction Step. Let k > 1 and suppose that we have already demonstrated that (T,h)∈EC(h) λ T,h (v) = (T ,h )∈EC(h ) λ T ,h (v) holds for all h, h ∈ G
with h, h ⊂ g and |h| = |h | < k. Let h, h ∈ G with h, h ⊆ g and |h| = |h | = k.
where the third equality uses that {(S,g) ∈ EC | (S,g) ¢ (T, h)} = {(S,g) ∈ EC | (S,g) ¡ (T, h)} ∪ {(T, h)}, the fifth equality uses thatg ⊂ h if (S,g) ¡ (T, h) (cf. Lemma 1), and the sixth equality uses that for everyg ⊂ h and S ∈ C(g) there is exactly one T ∈ C(h) such thatS ⊆ T .
Rearranging (12), we obtain
Similarly, we derive
Because h, h ⊆ g and |h| = |h |, there exists a bijective mapping f that maps {g |g ⊂ h} into {g |g ⊂ h } in such a way that for eachg ⊂ h it holds that |g| = |f (g)|. For eachg ⊂ h it holds thatg ⊂ g and |g| < k, and thus it follows from the induction hypothesis that
This, together with the fact that f is a bijective mapping that maps {g | g ⊂ h} into {g |g ⊂ h }, leads to
Using equality (13) , the fact that v is link anonymous on g, equality (15), and equality (14), respectively, we find
This concludes our proof of (11). We continue proving that the partition form position value satisfies link anonymity. Choose two links l, l ∈ g. Clearly, there exists a bijective mapping f that maps {h ⊆ g | l ∈ h} into {h ⊆ g | l ∈ h} in such a way that for each h ⊆ g with l ∈ h it holds that |h| = |f (h)|. Thus, it follows from (11) that for each h ⊆ g with l ∈ h
and consequently that 6
This, together with the fact that f is a bijective mapping that maps {h ⊆ g | l ∈ h} into {h ⊆ g | l ∈ h}, leads to
This allows us to conclude that we can find a β ∈ IR such that
for all l ∈ g. Using this, we derive
Axiomatization
We are now able to provide an axiomatization of the partition function form position value analogous to the axiomatization of the Shapley value in Shapley (1953) .
Theorem 3
The partition function form position value is the unique allocation rule on G × V that satisfies efficiency, additivity, the superfluous link property, and link anonymity.
Proof. The statement in the theorem follows straightforwardly from Lemmas 2, 3, 4, and 5, and Theorem 2. P
Alternative Extensions of the Axioms
In this section, we address the sensitivity of our results to possible different ways to extend the axioms of van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012) to the setting of partition function form network situations. The additivity axiom is unambiguous and we will not discuss alternative extensions of it.
Weak Superfluous Link Property
In Section 3.2 we indicated that there is an alternative way to extend the superfluous link property to the setting of pff network situations. Consider the extension in which we interpret the statement that the presence or absence of a link has no influence on the value to mean that the deletion of a link has no influence on the value obtained by any connected coalition of players in a network. For any network g ∈ G and pff value function v ∈ V, a link l ∈ g is strongly superfluous for g and v if
for all networks g ⊆ g and all embedded coalitions (S, g ) ∈ EC(g ).
It is obvious that a link that is strongly superfluous for a network g and pff value function v is also superfluous for g and v. Thus, the former requirement is stronger than the latter one. Using strongly superfluous links in the definition of the superfluous link property, we obtain the following property.
Weak Superfluous Link Property An allocation rule Y satisfies the weak superfluous link property if
for all pff value functions v ∈ V, all networks g ∈ G, and links l that are strongly superfluous for g and v.
Because every link that is strongly superfluous for a network g and pff value function v is also superfluous for g and v, the weak superfluous link property puts restrictions on fewer situations than the superfluous link property and therefore the former property is implied by the latter.
Even though it is a weaker property, we can use the weak superfluous link property to axiomatically characterize the partition function form position value.
Theorem 4
The partition function form position value is the unique allocation rule on G × V that satisfies efficiency, additivity, the weak superfluous link property, and link anonymity.
Proof. Clearly, π satisfies the weak superfluous link property, because this property is implied by the superfluous link property and π satisfies that property according to Lemma 4. As per Lemmas 2, 3, and 5, π also satisfies the other 3 properties. It remains to demonstrate that the 4 properties uniquely determine an allocation rule. This is easily accomplished by going through the proof of Theorem 2 and noting that in all instances where we derived that a link was superfluous, this was accomplished by aggregating over connected components for which we could derive the condition for a link being strongly superfluous on a per-component basis. By doing so, we can then use the weak superfluous link property instead of the superfluous link property to complete the proof of the theorem. P
Component Efficiency
In Section 3.2 we chose to extend the efficiency axiom rather than the component efficiency axiom that also appeared in van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012). In the current subsection we explore what we can do with a percomponent efficiency axiom in the pff value function setting.
Component Efficiency An allocation rule Y is component efficient if for all pff value functions v ∈ V, all networks g ∈ G, and all embedded coalitions
The following example demonstrates that the pff position value π does not satisfy component efficiency. N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and g = {12, 34}. 7 Consider the pff value function v given by v({i}, h) = 0 for each i ∈ N and h ⊂ g such that {i} ∈ C(h)
Example 1 Let
Using (1) to compute the unanimity coefficients, we obtain λ {i},h (v) = 0 for each i ∈ N and h ⊆ g such that {i} ∈ C(h)
Using these unanimity coefficients, we compute the partition function form position values
which shows that π is not component efficient.
We can define a component efficient variant of the position value as follows. For any h ⊆ g and T ∈ C(h) such that i ∈ T , we define s i,T,h to be the share that player i receives of the value of the connected coalition (T, h) defined by 8
The Component Partition Function Form Position Value The component partition function form position value (cpff position value for short) is the allocation rule π * : G ×V → IR N according to which each player i ∈ N in a network g ∈ G under pff value function v ∈ V receives
The component partition function form position value satisfies component efficiency, additivity, and the weak superfluous link property, as the following three lemmas demonstrate.
Lemma 6
The component partition function form position value is component efficient.
Proof. Let v ∈ V, g ∈ G, and S ∈ C(g).
where the first equality follows from the definition of π * , the second one from the definition of the shares s i,T,h , the third one from rearranging terms, and the fourth one from counting. The last equality follows from the construction of the unanimity coefficients in (1) . P
Lemma 7
The component partition function form position value is additive.
Proof. Let v 1 , v 2 ∈ V, g ∈ G, and i ∈ N . Then
where the second equality follows from the additivity of the unanimity coefficients, as demonstrated in the proof of lemma 3. P
Lemma 8
The component partition function form position value satisfies the weak superfluous link property.
Proof. Let v ∈ V, g ∈ G, and let l ∈ g be strongly superfluous for g and v.
for all g ⊆ g with l ∈ g and all S ∈ C(g ). We do this by induction to the number of links in a network.
Initial
Step. Let g ∈ G with g ⊆ g and l ∈ g and |g | = 1. Let i, j ∈ N such that l = ij. Then C(g ) consists of the pair {i, j} and the |N | − 2 singletons {k}, k ∈ N \{i, j}. For S = {k} ∈ C(g ), it holds that {(S,g) ∈ EC | (S,g) ¢ (S, g )} = {({k}, ∅), ({k}, g )} and, consequently, that
where in the last equality we use Corollary 1, which tells us that λ ({k},∅) (v) = 0 for all k ∈ N .
Since g \{l} = ∅, it also follows that
We can now derive
where the second equality uses that l is strongly superfluous for g and v.
where in the last equality we use Corollary 1. Since g \{l} = ∅, it also follows that
Induction
Step. Let k > 1 and suppose that we have already demonstrated that λ S,g (v) = 0 holds for all g ∈ G with g ⊆ g, l ∈ g and |g | < k, and all S ∈ C(g ). Let g ∈ G with g ⊆ g, l ∈ g and |g | = k. Also, let S ∈ C(g ). The following string of equalities holds:
where the third equality uses that {(S,g) ∈ EC | (S,g) ¢ (S, g )} = {(S,g) ∈ EC | (S,g) ¡ (S, g )} ∪ {(S, g )}, and the fifth equality uses thatg ⊂ g if (S,g) ¡ (S, g ) (cf. Lemma 1). The last equality follows from the induction hypothesis, because for eachg ⊂ g with l ∈g it holds that |g| < |g |, so that we know that λS ,g (v) = 0.
Rearranging (18), we obtain
We also derive
Because l is strongly superfluous for g and v, we know that
Using (19), (20) , and (21), respectively, we obtain
This concludes our proof of (17) . We continue proving that the component partition form position value satisfies the weak superfluous link property.
where the third equality follows from (17) . P
On the basis of lemmas 6, 7, and 8, the component partition function form position value could on axiomatic grounds be viewed as an alternative extension of the position value to pff network situations if it also satisfies the link anonymity axiom. However, the following example demonstrates that π * does not satisfy link anonymity.
Example 2 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and g = {12, 23, 34}. Consider the pff value function v defined on {(S, h) ∈ EC | h ⊆ g} by
Note that v is link anonymous on g because for each network h ⊆ g it holds that Note that π * 2 (g, v) = π * 3 (g, v), whereas these players have the same number of links, so that players' allocations are not proportional to the number of links that they are involved in.
Perhaps, however, there is a per-component variant of the link anonymity axiom that is satisfied by the component partition function form position value. We address this question in the following section.
Component Link Anonymity
In this section we explore potential per-component variants of the link anonymity axiom.
In Section 3.2 we extended link anonymity by requiring that the allocation awarded to each player is a fixed multiple of the number of links that (s)he is involved in in situations where the pff value function is such that the values of subnetworks depend only on the number of links involved in those networks. If we try to define a property like link anonymity on a percomponent basis, then we run into the problem that two networks h, h ⊆ g with |h| = |h | may induce completely different partitions C(h) and C(h ). For example, if |N | = 6 and |h| = |h | = 3, then in network h all the links may be in one component that encompasses 3 players (and leaves 3 players isolated), when in network h there may be three components each consisting of 2 players and one link between them. Thus, we define a per-component notion of link anonymity of a pff value function that is centered on the links in components rather than the players.
For any network g ∈ G, a pff value function v ∈ V is component link anonymous on g if there exists a function f : {0, 1, . . . , |g|} → IR such that for all subnetworks h ⊆ g and all components (T, h(T )),
Using this per-component notion of link anonymity of a network and bringing a similar per-component notion into the definition of link anonymity of an allocation rule, we obtain the following definition.
Component Link Anonymity An allocation rule Y is component link anonymous if for every network g ∈ G and pff value function v ∈ V that is component link anonymous on g, for every S ∈ C(g) there exists an α S ∈ IR such that
The following lemma shows that the requirement of component link anonymity of a pff value function is a very strong one since it implies that there cannot be any externalities between different connected coalitions. Showing this requires distinguishing between networks for which all its links are contained in one component and networks for which this is not the case. We call a network g ⊆ g N link-connected if there exists a connected coalition S ∈ C(g) such that g = g(S).
Lemma 9
If g ∈ G and v ∈ V are such that v is component link anonymous on g, then λ T,h (v) = 0 for all h ⊆ g and T ∈ C(h) with either |T | = 1 or h not link-connected (or both).
Proof. Let g ∈ G and v ∈ V such that v is component link anonymous on g. Let f : {0, 1, . . . , |g|} → IR be such that v(T, h) = f (|h(T )|) for all subnetworks h ⊆ g and all components (T, h(T )), T ∈ C(h), of h. It then follows that
where i ∈ N is chosen arbitrarily. We prove the lemma using induction to |T, h|.
Initial
Step. Let (T, h) ∈ EC such that |T, h| = 1. Then, obviously, |T | = 1 and h = ∅. Using the definition of the unanimity coefficients in (1) and equation (22), we obtain
Step. Let k > 1 and suppose that we have already demonstrated that λ T,h (v) = 0 for all h ⊆ g and T ∈ C(h) such that |T, h| < k and either |T | = 1 or h not link-connected. Let h ⊆ g and T ∈ C(h) such that |T, h| = k and either |T | = 1 or h not link-connected.
Case 1 |T | = 1. Using the definition of the unanimity coefficients in (1), we obtain
where the second equality uses that for all (T , h ) ∈ EC with (T , h ) ¡ (T, h) it holds that T = T and thus |T | = 1, and that |T , h | < |T, h| (Lemma 1), so that λ T ,h (v) = 0 by the induction hypothesis.
Case 2 |T | > 1 and h is not link-connected. Then h\h(T ) = ∅. Let l ∈ h\h(T ). Then T ∈ C(h\{l}) and
all (T , h ) ∈ EC with h ⊆ h(T ) and T ⊆ T and that thus by the induction hypothesis λ T ,h (v) = 0 if h is not link-connected. Combining equalities (23) , (24) , and (25), we obtain the desired result that λ T,h (v) = 0. P While the requirement of component link anonymity of a pff value function is strong enough to exclude the existence of any externalities between different connected coalitions, the following example demonstrates that this requirement is not strong enough to guarantee that within a component the players' (component) partition function form position values are proportional to the number of links in which they are involved.
Example 3 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and g = {12, 23, 34}. Consider the component link anonymous pff value function v given by
for each h ⊆ g and S ∈ C(h). Using (1) to compute the unanimity coefficients, we obtain λ {i},h (v) = 0 for each i ∈ N and h ⊂ g such that {i} ∈ C(h)
Using these unanimity coefficients, we compute the (component) partition function form position values
Note that
, so that players' allocations are not proportional to the number of links that they are involved in.
Because the unanimity coefficients are zero for all networks that are not link-connected, the component partition function form position value coincides with the partition function form position value in this example. This demonstrates that players' component partition function form position values also are not proportional to the number of links that they are involved in.
Example 3 demonstrates that neither the partition function form position value nor the component partition function form position value satisfy component link anonymity.
Lemma 9 and Example 3 have important implications for our attempt to define a useful per-component variant of the link anonymity axiom. Lemma 9 tells us that if we have a component link anonymous pff value function, then there are no externalities between various components and thus we essentially have a value function as in van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012). Example 3 then shows that we need to make additional assumptions in order to guarantee that within components the allocations of players are proportional to the number of links that they are involved in. In fact, in the setting of (non-pff) value functions we know from van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012) exactly what assumptions are necessary -namely that within a component the value of each network is completely determined by the number of its links. Note that this condition is not satisfied for the pff network situation in Example 3, where h = {12, 34} and h = {12, 23} each are two-link networks within the one component of g, but generate different values because v({1, 2}, {12, 34}) + v({3, 4}, {12, 34}) = v({1, 2, 3}, {12, 23}) + v({4}, {12, 23}).
We conclude that a suitable per-component variant of link anonymity needs to concentrate on the number of links within each component of a network g while simultaneously allowing for externalities between the various components of g. Isolated players (those not involved in any links) then need to be treated separately because externalities between components of networks imply that an isolated player can have a non-zero value in a network in which there are links between players in other components, while a requirement that isolated players receive a payoff proportional to the number of links they maintain would mandate them to always get a zero payoff. The following definition requires anonymity of links within a component while allowing for variation of the links outside the component.
For any network g ∈ G, a pff value function v ∈ V is per-component link anonymous on g if the following two conditions are satisfied 1. v({i}, h) = 0 for all subnetworks h ⊆ g and {i} ∈ C(h) 2. for all components (S, g(S)) ∈ EC(g) of g there exists a function f S : {0, 1, . . . , |g(S)|} × {g | g ⊆ g(N \S)} → IR such that for all subnetworks h ⊆ g This more refined per-component variant of the link anonymity axiom is also not satisfied by the partition function form position value, as we demonstrate in the following example. 
Conclusion
In this paper we set out to extend the axioms in van den Nouweland and Slikker (2012) to the setting of pff network situations and use the axioms obtained to define an extension of the position value for pff network situations. In Section 4 we identified the partition function form position value as the unique allocation rule that satisfies the extensions of the axioms that we defined in Section 3.2, namely efficiency, additivity, the superfluous link property, and link anonymity. In Section 5 we investigated possible alternative extensions of the axioms. We found a weak superfluous link property and showed that this property can be used instead of the superfluous link property to axiomatize the partition function form position value.
We also found a component efficiency axiom that is not satisfied by the partition function form position value, but that is satisfied by a percomponent version of that allocation rule and that we called the component partition function form position value. This latter allocation rule was shown to also satisfy additivity and the weak superfluous link property, but to violate link anonymity.
In Section 5.3 we considered possible alternative extensions of the link anonymity axiom and eventually arrived at the definition of per-component link anonymity. However, we showed that this property is not satisfied by either the partition function form position value or the component partition function form position value.
Combining the positive and negative results in this paper we conclude that the partition function form position value is the natural candidate for an extension of the position value for network situations to the setting of pff network situations on axiomatic grounds.
